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Editorial
The economics of municipal solid waste management
1. The environmental Kuznets curve and solid waste
For many years economists studying municipal solid waste
(MSW) were hampered by the general lack of data. Only a few
municipal governments bothered to keep accurate data on the
quantity of waste and recyclable materials generated and no
consortia were available for the little data that did exist. Early
economic researchers therefore resorted to contacting individ-
ual municipal governments or households to collect necessary
data, and the reliability and scope of these data were limited.
The past decade has seen the emergence of high quality state-
wide panel data in the United States and national panel data
in many other developed countries in Europe and Southeast
Asia. Economists have recently utilized these data to better
understand the empirical relationships important to MSW pol-
icy formation. What has been learned?
The environmental Kuznets curve suggests that although envi-
ronmental pollution initially increases with per-capita gross
domestic product (GDP), at some point GDP and emissions become
decoupled. Further increases in GDP can then be associated with
decreases in environmental pollution as production and treatment
technologies improve with national incomes. In the case of MSW,
for example, advances in technologies associated with recycling
and green design could improve with growing incomes. Although
a number of economic papers have been surveyed, empirical evi-
dence supporting the environmental Kuznets curve for solid waste
generation is scarce (Mazzanti et al., forthcoming). As an example,
a 1% increase in national income has been estimated to increase
the quantity of MSW by 0.69% using macroeconomic data from
30 OECD member countries over 20 years – the relationship be-
tween income and MSW quantities is positive and linear (John-
stone and Labonne, 2004). More recently, municipal-level panel
data in Japan show a slight decoupling of income and MSW quan-
tities (Yamamoto et al., 2009). MSW quantities are forecasted to
eventually decrease with income at income levels exceeding three
times their current levels. Given the traditional rate of income
growth, it appears likely that MSW quantities will continue to rise
with GDP for the next few generations unless major new techno-
logical advances are achieved. Perhaps, then, the appropriate ques-
tion in the short term remains how to best manage the expected
global increases in MSW.
2. The external costs of waste disposal
Although local and state governments manage MSW collection
and disposal in many parts of the world, private industries have
emerged in some nations to collect and dispose MSW. An impor-
tant question related to market provision is whether ﬁrms seeking
to maximize proﬁts generate outcomes consistent with social
goals. Because external costs are widely believed to be associated
with the private disposal of MSW, most countries regulate the dis-
posal process. In the 1970s for example, many developed countries
enacted detailed technology-based standards regulating the con-
struction and operation of MSW landﬁlls and incinerators.
Although these measures likely reduced signiﬁcantly the external
costs of MSW disposal, very little was known until the past few
years about the magnitude of these external costs. New research
has provided some important clues. In the Netherlands the exter-
nal marginal costs have been estimated at $4.26 per ton for land-
ﬁlls and $18 per ton for incineration (Dijkgraaf et al., 2004) with
the assumption that the cost of land utilized for landﬁll disposal
constitutes a private cost of disposal. By combining published
sources, the external marginal cost of landﬁlled MSW in Europe
was estimated between $5.39 and $8.76 per ton (Kinnaman,
2006). Similarly, the external cost of incineration in the United
States has been estimated at $5.26 per ton (Isely and Lowen,
2007). In comparison, the private marginal costs of waste collec-
tion and disposal are about $70 per ton in the United States and
perhaps as high as $200 per ton in densely populated areas such
as the Netherlands and Japan. Taken together, these studies sug-
gest the collection and disposal practices of private ﬁrms internal-
ize most of the costs of their activities. These costs are of course
reﬂected in the price levied to dispose MSW, and are therefore
internalized by MSW producers. Yet public policy may be neces-
sary to internalize the remaining $4–$18 per ton external costs
currently borne by society. What policy approaches are most
effective?
3. Pricing garbage by the bag
The external costs of disposal can be internalized by assessing a
per-bag user fee on the curbside collection of MSW. If an average
bag of MSW weighs about 20 pounds, then based on the results
above the optimal curbside per-bag fee should be roughly $0.75
in the US (or $2.15 in the Netherlands). The price of waste disposal
would then equal the private ($.70) plus external ($.05) marginal
costs of MSW collection and disposal and the market failure is
eliminated. Such unit-based pricing programs are common
throughout the United States, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
But these programs are costly to operate as municipal govern-
ments must devote resources to individually measuring each
household’s waste generation and to deter illegal dumping by
households attempting to avoid paying the per-bag fee. To make
such administrative efforts worthwhile, the per-bag fee should in-
duce households to reduce MSW by a sufﬁcient amount. New
sources of panel data (repeated observations for each of many
municipalities in a sample) have allowed economists to estimate
this decrease using advanced estimation techniques that control
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for endogeneity problems inherent in one-year cross sectional data
used in the past. This recent and forthcoming research suggests the
reduction in household MSW quantities in the Netherlands, in Ja-
pan (Usui, 2009), and in South Korea (Kim et al., 2008) is smaller
than previously estimated. The administrative costs of operating
these programs may exceed the welfare gains (Kinnaman, 2006).
But because these programs are revenue earning from the perspec-
tive of the local government, they may be politically difﬁcult to re-
move even where the net beneﬁts of the program are negative.
New data have also allowed economists to estimate other long
run effects of curbside per-bag pricing programs. If households re-
quire time to change disposal behaviors, then the long run reduc-
tion in MSW attributable to the curbside pricing program could
exceed the short run reduction. But households in Japan have been
estimated to behave in the opposite manner (Usui, 2009). A ‘‘re-
bound effect” was discovered where households in the long run re-
turn to old disposal habits following the implementation of unit-
pricing. New illegal dumping data are available in South Korea to
estimate the effect of unit-pricing on illegal disposal (residents re-
ceive a monetary award after reporting an illegal dumping site). A
1% increase in the price of waste is estimated to increase the num-
ber of illegal dumping reports by 3% (Kim et al., 2008). Finally, new
data from Grand Rapids, Michigan collected both before and after a
price increase from $1.00 to $1.25 per-bag was estimated to de-
crease waste by about 8% (Isely and Lowen, 2007) – a rather sub-
stantial amount. Recycling quantities were estimated to increase
by two-thirds of this reduction in waste quantity. Taken as a
whole, these new empirical results question the effectiveness of
using curbside per-bag pricing programs in all municipalities to
internalize the social costs of disposal. Household responses may
vary across municipalities, making a single policy approach
undesirable.
4. Curbside recycling – a recycling subsidy
Many theoretical models developed by economists support sub-
sidizing recycling at the curb rather than taxing waste (Shinkuma,
2003). Curbside recycling programs offered by many municipali-
ties throughout the developed world are examples of such subsi-
dies. Although the subsidy is in-kind rather than monetary – the
municipality pays to collect, transport, process, and market the
recyclable materials for households – it increases the opportunity
cost of generating waste and can therefore solve the problem of
market failure. The number of municipal recycling programs in
developed countries increased substantially during the 1990s but
has generally leveled off since.
The marginal cost of operating a municipal recycling program
are roughly $120 per ton for the ﬁrst ton recycled but decrease
with economies of scale by an estimated $2.13 per 1000 tons recy-
cled (Kinnaman, 2009). Because the private marginal cost of MSW
disposal is only about $70 per ton and the external cost ranges be-
tween $5 and $10 per ton (in the United States), the question arises
why many municipalities agree to pay more per ton to recycle
material than the social cost of simply disposing it. The answer
may lie in the tastes and preferences of local households, who
may value and therefore be willing to pay for the opportunity to re-
cycle (Kinnaman, 2005). These tastes may be based upon altruistic
preferences or may be related to some entertainment value associ-
ated with recycling. Regardless of the origin, economists have
repeatedly estimated a positive willingness to pay by households
for recycling. Using contingent ranking surveys, for example,
households have recently been estimates to be willing to pay
$3.27–$4.91 for access to separate yard waste collection and
$6.44–$9.66 for the opportunity for separate collection of yard
waste and recyclable materials in the United States (Caplan et al.,
2002). Households in China are estimated to pay $2.40 per month
for access to curbside collection of recyclable materials (Jin et al.,
2006). This willingness to pay among households both in the Uni-
ted States and in China is estimated to increase with household in-
come. Alternatively, although costs to the municipality in Nova
Scotia are estimated to increase by nearly $36 per person per year
with the implementation of recycling, the social net beneﬁts are
estimated to increase by $33–$175 per person per year (Wagner,
2007) – the ﬁrst study to ﬁnd positive social net beneﬁts associated
with municipal recycling without including household preferences.
Apparently empirical differences exist across municipalities in the
costs and beneﬁts of recycling as well.
5. Host fees and disposal taxes
MSW disposal facilities are owned and operated by private
industries in the United States and perhaps in a few other coun-
tries. Firms in these industries often operate under technology-
based standards issued by both state and federal governments. A
private ﬁrm interested in establishing a new landﬁll must convince
local governments to grant zoning and other legal permissions to
site the landﬁll. These negotiations often include a monetary pay-
ment to the local governments (Jenkins et al., 2004). For example,
private landﬁlls in Pennsylvania pay an average ‘‘host fee” of $4.05
per ton of waste disposed to local governments. Assuming local
governments behave rationally and are therefore unwilling to
grant permission to site a new landﬁll unless the terms are favor-
able, the host fees should equal or exceed the expected external
costs of MSW disposal expected by local residents. In a competitive
market, the fee these ﬁrms charge for waste disposal is equal to the
private marginal cost of waste disposal. Private marginal costs in-
clude the costs of land, labor, machinery, and other resources used
to accept and process waste using methods acceptable to state and
federal governments. Host fees increase the private marginal cost
of disposal and therefore the price of disposal. The social costs of
MSW waste disposal are therefore internalized by waste genera-
tors. Public policies beyond the technology-based standards de-
signed to alter household disposal patterns are not necessary.
Curbside user fees, curbside recycling program, producer extended
responsibility measures (Germany’s green dot program), recycling
content standards, and landﬁll taxation are all unnecessary policy
instruments if garbage generators pay the social marginal costs
of MSW at these private landﬁlls.1
6. Developing countries
Empirical economic research has also emerged in developing
countries. Using contingent valuation method (CVM) surveys,
households in three squatter Malaysian villages are estimated to
be willing to pay $3.42 per month for regular waste collection
rather than having to discard waste in streets or transport waste
to area open dumps (Murad et al., 2007). Similarly, using 200
CVM surveys low-income households in Nigeria are estimated to
be willing to pay $1.70–$1.80 per month for regular waste collec-
tion (Fonta et al., 2008). Willingness to pay for basic MSW collec-
tion in both of these areas is estimated to increase with
household income. Thus, establishing proper collection and dis-
posal methods appear to be the primary concerns in developing
countries. Developing strategies to increase recycling are not yet
policy concerns.
1 Waste generators pay more than the social marginal cost of waste disposal if the
disposal industry is not perfectly competitive. Waste generators pay less than the
social marginal cost of waste disposal if landﬁlls or incinerators contribute to climate
change. Presumably whatever federal legislation is passed to mitigate climate change
could also apply to MSW landﬁlls and incinerators.
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7. The shape of future empirical research
Thus, the economics empirical literature over the past several
year suggests (1) the external costs of MSW disposal are perhaps
smaller than previously expected, (2) the change in household
behavior attributable to unit-pricing programs is smaller than
previously estimated, and (3) curbside recycling remains valu-
able to households, even if the net beneﬁts of recycling pro-
grams are not otherwise positive. More research is needed to
understand the robustness of these conclusions. Furthermore,
we are learning that the external costs of MSW disposal, the dis-
posal behavior of households, and preferences for recycling vary
across municipalities and countries. What is necessary, then, are
more local and regional empirical studies of household disposal
behavior and especially new estimations of the external costs
of MSW to form optimal MSW policy within each region. Finally,
household preferences for recycling opportunities are largely
responsible for the beneﬁts of curbside recycling to exceed the
costs. If these preferences are permanent, then curbside recycling
policies will continue to be efﬁcient. But if preferences for recy-
cling opportunities fade with time, then many municipal recy-
cling programs may become inefﬁcient unless program costs
diminish with maturity and experience.
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